Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence in a simple macroeconomic model, which incorporates rational learning by the central bank as well as private sector agents. Two conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew the true parameters. In the dynamic version, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy. I find that the optimal policy that balances the cautionary and activist motives typically exhibits gradualism, that is, it still remains less aggressive than a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions occur when uncertainty is very high and inflation close to target. JEL Classification System: E52, E24, D8, C61.
Introduction
A number of central banks of industrialized countries have committed themselves to an explicit inflation targeting strategy and such a strategy has also been recommended for the European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve System. In implementing this strategy central banks are faced with considerable uncertainty concerning the exact effect of their principal instrument, the short-term nominal interest rate, on inflation. 1 A particularly important and much discussed source of uncertainty regarding the transmission of monetary policy to inflation is the relationship between unemployment and inflation. In implementing policy, central banks have to rely on empirical estimates of the natural unemployment rate (or NAIRU) 2 , the slope of the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence. Estimates of these parameters have changed over time and their precision is the subject of a continuing active debate. 3 Indeed, Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997a , 1997b ) investigate a variety of empirical specifications for the United States and find that a typical 95% confidence interval for the natural rate in 1990 was about 2.5 percentage points wide. The width of this confidence interval is closely related to the standard error of the slope of the short-run Phillips curve-most clearly in a linear framework, where estimates of the natural rate are obtained from the ratio of intercept and slope.
In general, a policy that would be optimal if the parameters of the inflationunemployment relationship were known with certainty will be recognized as suboptimal once the uncertainty associated with these parameters is taken into account. In this paper, I characterize the optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the weight on forward-looking 1 As a result, inflation-targeting central banks such as the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank have given the discussion of inflation uncertainty center stage in their inflation reports.
2 An acronym for non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. 3 For the recent empirical debate in the United States see Gordon (1997) , Watson (1997a), (1997b) and (2002), Blanchard and Katz (1997) , Fuhrer (1995) , Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) , Phelps and Zoega (1997) . There also exists a large literature on Phillips curves in other countries, see for example Debelle and Laxton (1997) and others.
expectations versus lagged inflation in the determination of current inflation. Two conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, Phillips curve uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew all the parameter values. In the dynamic version with learning by the central bank and private agents, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy.
Analysis of the motive for cautionary policy due to multiplicative parameter uncertainty goes back to Brainard (1967) and has been used to justify a gradualist approach to monetary policy. For example, Alan Blinder (1995, p.13) , when he was vice-chairman of the Board of Governors, argued that "a little stodginess at the central bank is entirely appropriate", and proposed in his Marshall lectures that "central banks should calculate the change in policy required to get it right and then do less". 4 However, there are a number of reasons to believe that such a Brainard-type analysis overstates the case for gradualism. For example, Caplin and Leahy (1996) show that in a game between a policymaker who attempts to stimulate the economy and potential investors, a cautious policy move may be ineffectual, because investors anticipate lower interest rates in the future. Alternatively, proponents of robust control in monetary policy 5 have argued that worst-case outcomes may best be prevented by following policy rules that are rather aggressive in responding to inflation deviations from target. A further reason, investigated in this paper, is that a more aggressive policy rule may generate more information, which would improve the precision of future estimates and thereby future policy performance. Policymakers have noted this link between policy and learning. For example, Stiglitz (1997) The tradeoff between current stabilization and exploration for the sake of better control 4 See also Blinder (1998) for a discussion of this strategy. 5 See for example Sargent (1999a) , Hansen and Sargent (2001) .
in the future has been the focus of a theoretical as well as a computational literature on optimal learning. 6 Recent applications to monetary policy under uncertainty have been provided by Bertocci and Spagat (1993) , Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and Wieland (2000b) .
Among these, Wieland (2000b) studies the most general learning problem-a linear regression with two unknown parameters-and numerically computes the optimal policy. 7 Analytical results concerning optimal policy under parameter uncertainty are largely absent from the literature and numerical results are rare, because of the nonlinear nature of the dynamic learning problem. Compared to the simple regression framework considered in previous work, the problem studied in this paper is further complicated by the presence of a lag as well as a forward-looking expectation of the dependent variable. The numerical algorithm used in this paper is described in more detail in appendix A. This paper makes the following contributions. First, extending Brainard's analysis I derive a cautionary policy rule in a model that incorporates rational forward-looking behavior by private sector agents in labor and financial markets. I focus on the case of an inflation-targeting central bank that commits to a specific interest rate rule in the face of uncertainty about the NAIRU, the short-run slope of the Phillips curve and the weight on inflation persistence in terms of lagged inflation versus forward-looking inflation expectations. This cautionary rule represents the optimal policy under commitment in the static version of the model, where the central bank only cares about current performance and disregards dynamic learning effects. I find that the cautionary rule implies gradualism, that is, policy responds to inflationary or disinflationary shocks such that inflation gradually returns to target and policy remains tight or expansive for several periods.
6 One part of the literature focussed primarily on the asymptotic properties of beliefs and actions. (cf. Taylor (1974) , Anderson and Taylor (1976) , Easley and Kiefer (1988) , Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) and Aghion et al. (1991) ), while the other part focussed on characterizing optimal decision rules (cf. Prescott (1972) , Kendrick (1981) , Kendrick (1982) , Mizrach (1991) , Amman and Kendrick (1995) , Keller and Rady (1999), Wieland (2000a) ).
7 Asymptotic properties of beliefs and policies in this framework have been studied by Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) , who have shown that incomplete learning may occur. Kasa (1999) also discusses the possibility of incomplete learning by a central bank. Wieland (2000b) has evaluated the speed of learning under alternative policies as well as the frequency with which a persistent bias in money growth and inflation may arise due to such self-reinforcing incorrect beliefs subsequent a structural change such as German unification.
Second, the paper presents numerical results concerning the optimal policy in a dynamic model with rational learning 8 by the central bank as well as forward-looking agents in labor and financial markets. I find that the optimal policy incorporates a quantitatively significant degree of experimentation as indicated by a more aggressive policy response than under the cautionary Brainard-type policy. However, the optimal policy typically remains less aggressive than a certainty-equivalent policy that completely disregards parameter uncertainty.
Thus, in most cases the recommendation for gradualist policymaking under parameter uncertainty survives in the dynamic model with learning. Only, when uncertainty is very high and inflation close to target, does the optimal policy imply a more aggressive response than a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. I proceed to quantify the optimal degree of gradualism and experimentation using empirical estimates of Phillips curve parameter uncertainty by Fuhrer (1995) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002) . In analyzing the optimal extent of experimentation I also investigate in detail how it is influenced by the presence of forward-looking rational inflation expectations in the Phillips curve and and financial markets (i.e. the money market relevant for the definition of the short-term real interest rate). The qualitative properties of the optimal policy are the same under rational learning by private agents as under adaptive expectations. However, the optimal extent of experimentation is smaller, because forward-looking behavior by private agents introduces an expectations channel of monetary policy transmission.
Third, the policy rules derived in this paper are directly comparable to Taylor-style interest rate rules that have been studied extensively in the recent literature on monetary policy. 9 This literature has focused on evaluating the performance of monetary policy rules in different macroeconometric models under the assumption that all parameters are known with certainty. The analysis in this paper shows how the response coefficients of such a policy rule need to be adjusted in the presence of uncertainty about the relationship between unemployment and inflation.
8 Boundedly rational learning by central banks is studied by Sims (1988) and Sargent (1999b) . 9 See for example Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999 , Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), McCallum (1999) , Gertler (1998, 1999) , Williams (1999, 2002) and many others.
The next section introduces the macroeconomic model that forms the basis of the subsequent analysis of optimal policy rules under uncertainty. In section 3 the cautionary Brainard-type policy rule is derived analytically. Section 4 presents the dynamic framework with learning. A quantitative comparison of the optimal, cautionary and certaintyequivalent policy rules is provided in section 5. Section 6 relates these findings to empirically documented Phillips curve uncertainty. Section 7 concludes and discusses several extensions and avenues for future research.
The model
To begin, I consider a central bank that pursues a strict inflation-targeting strategy as defined by Svensson (1997a) . Such a central bank conducts monetary policy so as to minimize expected squared deviations from its inflation target π * . 10 This loss function can be decomposed in two terms indicating the possibility of a tradeoff between the conditional expectation of inflation deviations from target and the conditional variance of inflation:
In the following, I characterize optimal monetary policy under uncertainty for this central bank within a simple model of the macroeconomy that follows Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999) . The centerpiece of this model is a Phillips curve that explicitly introduces inflation persistence, in the form of lagged inflation, together with forward-looking inflation expectations:
Current inflation π t is related to the deviation of the unemployment rate u t from the natural rate with a negative slope parameter β. Furthermore, it depends on lagged inflation π t−1 , price-setters' expectation of inflation π e t , and a normally-distributed random shock components' model of the Phillips curve (cf. Buiter and Miller (1985) ). The backwardlooking component reflects inertia in inflation that may be derived from some types of overlapping wage contracts 11 or may be attributed to the presence of rule-of-thumb price setters. The coefficients of the two components sum to unity so that in the long-run equilibrium, π t = π t−1 = π e t . As γ approaches zero, this specification simplifies to the standard Lucas surprise supply function. For γ = 1 it corresponds to the traditional accelerationist Phillips curve. 12 The long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment, i.e. the natural rate, is denoted by u * t . An often used assumption regarding the evolution of u * t is:
where 
It remains to specify private sector expectations of inflation, π e t . The benchmark for the following analysis will be the case of rational expectations. For comparison I will also 11 See for example Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,b) . 12 Typical empirical estimates of this specification indicate a significant degree of inflation persistence ranging from 0.5 to near unity (cf. Fuhrer (1997) and Roberts (1997) ). The New-Keynesian Phillips curve, that has received much interest in the recent literature (cf. Gali and Gertler (1999) ), differs from the above specification only in the timing of the forward-looking inflation term which concerns period t + 1. The preferred empirical specification of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve also embodies a significant degree of inflation persistence.
13 For a textbook discussion of this empirical regularity see Dornbusch and Fischer (1990) . Clark et al. (1999) do not need this relationship, because they specify the Phillips curve in terms of the output gap rather than the unemployment gap.
consider the case of adaptive, random-walk expectations, i.e. π e t = π t−1 . In that case the Phillips curve specification (2) simplifies again to the traditional accelerationist Phillips curve and the ex-post real interest rate appears in the aggregate demand relationship. Under forward-looking behavior, expected inflation will be a function of the state of the economy, the parameters and importantly also the policy rule pursued by the central bank:
Here the private sector's expectation regarding monetary policy is denoted by i e t . It indicates that we need to distinguish between discretionary policy and a possible commitment by the central bank to a specific policy rule. Under discretion, the central bank optimizes policy taking private sector expectations as given and unaffected by its choice of interest rate.
Under commitment, the central bank internalizes the impact of its decision rule on private sector expectations and commits to delivering the state-contingent interest rate setting that is expected under this rule. The recent literature on monetary policy rules 14 has emphasized the benefits of adhering to a rule rather than pursuing discretionary policy. Thus, in the following analysis I will focus on the optimal policy under commitment and only return to the case of discretion in the last section of the paper.
The central bank will set the nominal interest rate i t so as to minimize L(.) based on its knowledge of the state of the economy (i.e. lagged inflation), the parameters (i.e. β, γ and the natural rate) but before the shocks t and η t are realized. It can predict and respond to impending changes in inflation only to the extent that they result from endogenous inflation persistence but not to the current-period random shocks. When the central bank is committed to a state-contingent rule such as
it will implicitly take into account how its actions affect private sector expectations. Clarke et al. (1999) show that the optimal policy under commitment to such a rule can be obtained 14 See for example the contributions in Taylor (1999) .
by minimizing the loss function L(.) with respect to i t and i e t under the explicit restriction that the ex-ante expected nominal interest rate, i e t , is equal to its rational expectation: 15
From (7) and (8) and the assumption made earlier that neither the central bank nor the private sector have prior information on the random shocks ( t , η t ) when choosing i t and i e t respectively, it follows that the private sector's ex-ante rational expectation of the nominal interest rate will be equal to the interest rate prescribed by the state-contingent policy rule, λ, φ) . As a result, the private sector's rational expectation of inflation is
Furthermore, due to symmetric information between central bank and private sector, the expectation derived in (9) also corresponds to the central bank's rational expectation of inflation that enters the loss function (1). 16 The second element of the loss function is the conditional variance of inflation,
which turns out not to depend on the interest rate rule. Thus, the central bank will be able to minimize its loss L(.) simply by setting the interest rate to the value that induces an expected inflation rate equal to the inflation target E t−1 [π t ] = π * . This corresponds to a strategy of "inflation forecast targeting" as defined by Svensson (1997a) . As a result, the expected deviation from target will be equal to zero and the minimized loss will correspond to the exogenous conditional variance (10). The implied optimal interest rate rule is:
15 Note that in this notation, the private sector's expectations of inflation and the nominal interest rate, π e t and i e t are variables, while Et−1πt and Et−1it, the rational expectations at t − 1 are functions of the policy rule, lagged inflation and the parameters. Committing to Et−1 [it] has also been used as commitment strategy by Svensson (1997b) and many others.
16 Possible extensions allowing for asymmetric information are discussed in the final section of the paper.
The first term of this rule essentially represents the equilibrium real interest rate, which is related to the natural unemployment rate. The second term represents the central bank's response to past inflation that is intended to return inflation to its target value in the next period. Note that the parameters β, λ and φ are all negative and the central bank responds
to an increase in inflation by raising the nominal interest rate in the following period. The magnitude of the necessary policy response depends on the degree of inflation persistence and the slope of the Phillips curve as well as the slope parameter of Okun's law and the aggregate demand equation. As can be seen from (11) the neutral setting of the nominal interest rate when inflation is on target is:
To clarify the effect of rational expectations in this model I also derive the optimal policy rule under adaptive random-walk expectations (i.e. π e t = π t−1 ):
A comparison of the partial derivatives of (11) and (12) with respect to lagged inflation shows that the central bank needs to respond to an increase in inflation by raising the nominal interest rate in the subsequent period to a much greater extent if the private sector forms adaptive rather than rational expectations, (βφλ − 1)(βφλ)
The reason is that under rational expectations the private sector expects the central bank 17 Under strict inflation targeting with known parameters the optimal rule in the static model is in fact also dynamically optimal.
Parameter uncertainty and cautionary policy
The policy rule (11) cannot be implemented if the parameters of the Phillips curve, that is, the natural unemployment rate u * t , the slope β and the index of persistence γ are unknown.
However the policymaker can obtain recursive estimates from the following equation:
The intercept of this equation corresponds to the product of the unknown slope and the natural rate and may therefore vary over time according to:
The means of the intercept, slope and persistence parameters as of t − 1 are denoted by
while the degree of uncertainty about these parameters based on t − 1 information is characterized by the following covariance matrix:
The twelve variables (a t−1 , b t−1 , Σ t|t−1 ) define a trivariate normal distribution which comprises all relevant information about the unknown parameters (α t , β, γ) at time t-1. This distribution represents the policymaker's beliefs about the parameters of the Phillips curve. 18
The NAIRU is not an explicit element of this distribution, but as in the empirical literature on Phillips curves the ratio of the means can be used as an estimator for the NAIRU:
18 Note that for mathematical convenience, the variances of the normally distributed shocks σ 2 ν , σ 2 are assumed to be known. This is a standard assumption in the optimal learning literature (see Easley and Kiefer (1988) , Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) ). It guarantees that given a normal prior, the posterior belief will also be a normal distribution. The normality assumption regarding the parameter estimates does not take into account the restrictions on the sign or the magnitude of the parameters, s.t. the non-negativity of the natural unemployment rate or the constraint of the persistence index to (0,1]. We maintain this assumption throughout this section for tractability of the theoretical analysis. The numerical analysis later on will recognize the explicit constraint on the index parameter γ in assessing the impact of policy on future estimates.
This illustrates that the uncertainty about NAIRU estimates that is emphasized in the empirical literature on Phillips curves cannot be discussed separately from the uncertainty that is associated with slope of the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff.
Given our starting assumption of symmetric information between central bank and private sector this distribution also represents the private sector beliefs about the unknown parameters. Furthermore, for the remainder of this analysis we will continue to treat the other parameters, (λ, φ), as known. Then, the central bank's and private sector's expectation of inflation as of t − 1 that appeared in equation (13) 
This "certainty-equivalent" policy rule is useful as a benchmark for comparison but it is clearly not optimal in the presence of parameter uncertainty. The one-period optimal policy rule can be derived analytically by minimizing the current expected loss, L(.), conditional on all available information, including the degree of uncertainty associated with the parameter estimates. As noted previously, the loss L(.) consists of two components. The first component, the square of the expected deviation of inflation from target, uses the inflation expectation defined by (18). The second component is the conditional variance of inflation:
where u t = φλ(H(.) − E t−1 π t ) and E t−1 π t defined as in (18) This variance depends on the degree of parameter uncertainty and on the chosen policy rule. As a consequence, the central bank faces a trade-off between the expected deviation of inflation from target and the conditional variance of inflation. Thus, the optimal rule does not simply imply inflation-forecast targeting but importantly takes into account inflation uncertainty. Since its response to uncertainty reflects caution as a motive in monetary policymaking, I will refer to it as the 'cautionary' rule. It takes the form:
where the effect of the parameter variances and covariances is summarized by (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ): 
Thus, under parameter uncertainty the central bank will increase the nominal interest rate subsequent an inflationary shock by less than in the absence of uncertainty. This increase in the interest rate will not be sufficient to return next period inflation to target in expectation.
Thus, under parameter uncertainty even a strict inflation-targeting central bank will not pursue a pure inflation-forecast targeting strategy defined as keeping expected inflation always on target. Instead, inflation will remain elevated and only return to target gradually over the next few periods. Similarly, the interest rate will exhibit gradualism in that it will be expected to remain elevated and only return to its neutral level after some time.
The cautionary policy rule (21) also exhibits a second element of caution or gradualism.
This becomes apparent when we consider its implications in a situation where last period's inflation rate is equal to the central bank's target, π t−1 = π * . It may seem surprising at first that the cautionary rule does not prescribe the same neutral setting as the certaintyequivalent rule in this case. The certainty-equivalent rule would set the nominal interest rate equal to its estimated neutral rate, (λφ) −1 a t−1 b 
Here the first term in large parentheses corresponds to the neutral or natural level of the nominal interest rate, which ensures that unemployment is equal to the NAIRU, while the second term corresponds to the variance-minimizing level of the nominal interest rate, given
By definition the variance-minimizing level of the nominal interest rate is that level where the central bank will be able to assess the impact of the nominal interest rate on unemployment and inflation with the highest possible precision. Thus, the tendency to set the nominal interest rate near that level whenever inflation is on target clearly reflects a cautionary motive. Again, this motive implies a gradualist pursuit of policy. This becomes particularly clear when considering the case of constant natural unemployment rate u * t = u * 0 , i.e. a constant intercept, α, in the estimated inflation equation (13) rate. Thus, when the optimal rule leans towards the variance-minimizing level of the interest rate it effectively keeps the ex-post real interest rate closer to its past average. As a result, the policy stance changes more gradually over time as would be prescribed by a policy rule that disregards inflation uncertainty arising from imprecise parameter estimates.
Clearly, the cautionary policy rule (21) that minimizes expected one-period loss is not necessarily optimal in a dynamic context. It is a "myopic" policy, because it disregards the effect of the current interest rate setting on future parameter estimates and policy performance. In the next section, I show how the estimates of the parameters of the inflation equation (13) 
where
Under the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed with known variances σ 2 and σ 2 ν , (25) is equivalent to Bayesian updating 20 of the trivariate normal distribution that represents the central bank's and private sector's beliefs about α t , β and γ. 21 Under the assumption of a constant natural unemployment rate, these updating equations are also equivalent to recursive least squares. In that case the intercept parameter α will be constant and the only change in the updating equations will be that v a t|t−1 = v a t−1 .
As a result of rational learning by the central bank and the private sector the current choice of the interest rate will affect the precision of the point estimates as well as the 20 The asymptotic behavior of these beliefs is discussed further in appendix B.
21 This dynamic learning model extends earlier analysis of optimal learning by Wieland (2000a) and (2000b) in a simple regression framework. It allows for a lagged dependent variable with an additional unknown parameter and includes the rational expectation of the dependent variable. These extensions raise the number of state variables and increase computational complexity, but their benefit is to allow application of the optimal learning framework to a simple but completely specified model of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
estimates themselves through its impact on current unemployment, inflation expectations and inflation. By choosing the interest rate appropriately, the policymaker can raise the precision of parameter estimates and improve future performance, albeit at the expense of higher current variability of inflation. Thus, the optimal policy rule H(π t−1 , θ t−1 , π * , λ, φ) in this dynamic model with learning solves the following optimization problem:
and s.t. equations (4) , (5) , (13) , (18) and (25) This is a dynamic discrete-time stochastic control problem, which can be rewritten as a dynamic program. A nonstandard feature of this dynamic problem is that decisions affect the expectations operator itself. However, one can still use a standard contraction mapping argument as in Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) In the lower equation in (27), time t values of inflation and beliefs have been substituted out using equations (4), (5), (13), (18) 
It is the dynamically optimal counterpart of the certainty-equivalent and cautionary policy rules (19) and (21) that were derived analytically in the preceding section. Unfortunately analytical solutions for H opt (.) are not available due to the nonlinear nature of the dynamic decision problem. However, one can use numerical dynamic programming methods to approximate the value function and the optimal policy rule.
The optimal balance of caution and experimentation
The Bellman equation (27) defines a contraction mapping with a unique fixed point, which is the value function. Starting from an initial guess of the value function, one can obtain successively better approximations by repeatedly solving the optimization problem on the right-hand side of (27). As is well known, this iterative method can be implemented numerically. However, its application is hampered by the "curse of dimensionality" which implies that the number of necessary computations increases geometrically with the number of state variables. The numerical algorithm used here combines such value function iterations with policy iterations to speed up convergence. Nevertheless, the optimal learning problem with three unknown parameters in (26), which has a total of 10 continuous state variables is too large to be solved numerically with reasonable precision. 
To conduct numerical analysis of the optimal learning problem it is necessary to specify numerical values for several parameters. The chosen values are reported in Table 1 . 22 The numerical algorithm and associated computation costs are discussed in more detail in appendix A.
Policy with uncertain β
First, I consider optimal learning by the central bank when private sector agents form adaptive expectations, i.e. π e t = π t−1 . The following five findings are directly apparent from Figure 1 . First, not surprisingly the certainty-equivalent and cautionary policy rules respond linearly to inflation for a given degree of uncertainty, while the optimal rule responds in a nonlinear fashion. Second, the optimal rule always requires a more aggressive policy response to inflation than the cautionary rule. In absolut terms this difference, which represents the extent of experimentation incorporated in the optimal rule, changes little for moderate to high inflation deviations from target. 24 Third, the optimal rule typically implies a less aggressive policy stance than the certainty-equivalent rule that disregards parameter uncertainty. Thus, in spite of the incentive to experiment, the optimal policy exhibits gradualism. The policy tightening (or easing) following a shock to inflation is expected to persist for more than one period and implies a gradual return of inflation towards the target. Fourth, when lagged inflation is near the target (typically within less than 1 percentage point), the optimal policy response is somewhat more aggressive than the certainty-equivalent rule. Fifth, when uncertainty is policy response that will be expected to generate quite a bit of information about the inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the location of the natural rate.
extremely high (i.e. t-statistic < 1), the optimal policy rule exhibits a clear discontinuity at zero inflation. In other words, the optimal policy response at zero inflation differs from the neutral setting that would ensure an expected inflation rate equal to zero. It implies that the central bank accepts higher or lower expected inflation in order to obtain more precise parameter estimates and improve inflation stabilization in the future. Finally, I also add rational learning by private sector agents in financial markets, that is, I incorporate forward-looking expectations of inflation in the definition of the real interest rate. The policy response to lagged inflation under the alternative rules is reported in Figure 3 . Again, the optimal rule exhibits the same qualitative properties as previously. However, the presence of forward-looking expectations in financial markets further increases the power of the expectations channel of policy transmission. As a result, the policy rules are less aggressive and the optimal extent of experimentation is reduced.
Policy with uncertain α and β
Next, I consider the learning problem with unknown slope and intercept. This problem has six state variables. The dynamic programming algorithm described in the appendix . 25 Furthermore, the index of persistence will be set equal to 0.8.
As discussed in section 3, even when lagged inflation is on target, the variance- va=3. 24, vab=0.54, vb=0.09 va=5.76,vab=0.96,vb=0.16 va=9,vab=1.5,vb=0.25 adaptive expectations rational learning in labor markets rational learning in labor and financial markets opt cert caut minimizing setting of the nominal interest rate with two unknown parameters need not coincide with the neutral setting, which ensures future expected inflation to be on target.
In the following I present two sets of results. For the first set, displayed in Figure 4 , the covariance v ab is chosen exactly so that the variance-minimizing setting of the nominal interest rate coincides with the neutral setting when inflation is on target. Thus, the expected real interest rate and unemployment rate will coincide with their natural levels when lagged inflation equals the target of zero inflation. The second set of results, displayed in Figure 5 considers values of the covariance which imply a variance-minimizing level of the interest rate below the natural level. The first key result is that the findings from the learning problem with unknown slope concerning the optimal policy response to inflation carry over to the learning problem with unknown intercept and slope. The optimal response typically falls inside the wedge created by the aggressive certainty-equivalent rule and the cautionary rule. Optimal policy always incorporates a small extent of experimentation but mostly remains gradualist, that is, less aggressive than a certainty-equivalent rule that disregards parameter uncertainty.
Exceptions to the principle of gradualism only occur near the inflation target or under extreme uncertainty. Even then, these exceptions are small in magnitude. The second result is that the stronger the expectations channel of monetary policy, the smaller the required policy response to inflation and thus the smaller the differences between the optimal, certainty-equivalent and cautionary rules. As discussed above a second source of gradualism may arise from the covariance of intercept and slope. This effect is illustrated by Figure 5 . The three panels in this figure correspond to the first column of panels in Figure 4 . The only difference is the value of the covariance v ab . It is now set so that the variance-minimizing level of the interest rate lies below its natural rate even when lagged inflation is on target. This occurs whenever the policy stance has been on average below the natural rate for the sample with which the parameters have been estimated.
As a result, the cautionary rule implies a substantially easier policy stance than the certainty-equivalent rule, that is unaffected by the parameter covariance. However, this 
Policy with uncertain β and γ
One key result emerging from the preceding comparisons is that rational learning by private sector agents tends to reduce the wedge between the certainty-equivalent and cautionary rules and consequently also the optimal extent of gradualism (i.e. the difference between the certainty-equivalent and optimal rules) and of experimentation (i.e. the difference between optimal and cautionary rules). To some degree this finding may depend on the fact that the parameter γ which determines the impact of inflation expectations on inflation and governs the strength of this expectations channel of monetary transmission has so far been treated as known with certainty. As can be seen from all panels the qualitative findings of the one-unknown parameter case, also survive in this context. Quantitatively, there is still a noticeable extent of experimentation, but the optimal rule remains almost always less aggressive than the certainty-equivalent rule, except under very high uncertainty near the inflation target.
Empirical Examples
The question remains to what extent the differences between optimal, cautionary and certainty-equivalent policy rules discussed in the preceding section are of quantitative importance given the degree of uncertainty reflected in empirical estimates of the Phillips curve. Estimating the complete model with rational learning goes beyond the objective of this paper. Instead, I relate the numerical analysis conducted here to some of the empirical estimates available in the literature.
The standard framework for estimating the inflation-unemployment relationship takes the following linear form:
This regression equation usually includes several lags of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate and a vector z t that contains proxy variables for supply shocks and various dummy variables. An estimate of a constant natural rate u * t = u * ∀ t, can be obtained from the ratio of the estimated regression constant and the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged unemployment rates,û * = a(
Thus, the degree of uncertainty regarding NAIRU estimates discussed in the literature is directly related to the precision of estimates of the slope of the Phillips curve. As shown in preceding section, this type of uncertainty is more important to monetary policy decisions than the component of NAIRU uncertainty that derives from the variance of the intercept a in the above regression equation.
I consider estimates from two contributions to the ongoing debate on Phillips curves and NAIRU uncertainty in the United States (cf. Fuhrer (1995) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002) ). Both papers report estimates of a version of the above regression equation (29) with a constraint that the coefficients on lagged inflation rates sum to one. This corresponds to γ = 1 in the model of this paper, and thus to the Phillips curve without forward-looking component. The estimates I consider are summarized in Table 2 . The first set of estimates is taken from Fuhrer (1995) , page 47, Table 1a . 27 The intercept estimate, its variance and its covariance with the sum of slope coefficients reported here have been computed using the complete regression results that I received from the author. As to Staiger et al. (2002) , I only use the slope estimate and its variance from the first column of Table 1 .2 on page 18. 28 Table 3 reports the optimal extent of gradualism (the difference between the optimal and certainty-equivalent rule) and of experimentation (the difference between optimal and cautionary rule) given the empirically estimated degree of uncertainty. The two columns refer to inflation deviations from target of 2% and 3% respectively. The values reported in the table concern the differences in the expected unemployment rates that result from the alternative policy rules.
In both cases I restrict attention to the optimal policy under adaptive expectations in the Phillips curves, which fits the specifications chosen by those authors. This also implies that 27 These estimates were obtained using quarterly data on the CPI excluding food and energy and the civilian unemployment rate from 1960:2Q to 1993:4Q. The author uses 12 lags of inflation and 2 lags of the unemployment rate as well as the oil price as supply shock proxy.
28 This regression uses the GDP Deflator as measure of prices and the civilian unemployment rate. It differs importantly from Fuhrer's specification in that the intercept and thus the NAIRU is time-varying. 
Fuhrer ( with unknown slope. The optimal policy always lies in between the certainty-equivalent and cautionary rules. Thus, the certainty-equivalent rule is too aggressive in fighting inflation while the cautionary rule implies too much gradualism. The differences between the optimal policy and these alternatives are economically significant, ranging from one half to a full percentage point of the unemployment rate.
Conclusions and extensions
The bottomline of the preceding analysis is that an inflation-targeting central bank should not disregard uncertainty about the relationship between unemployment and inflation. Typically, it will be optimal to respond more gradually to inflationary shocks than a central bank that disregards such uncertainty. However, gradualism can be overdone. In particular, a central bank that implements Brainard's recommendation of gradualist policymaking in a myopic manner and disregards dynamic learning effects will respond too cautiously to inflationary shocks. A central bank that recognizes the tradeoff between current control and experimentation for the sake of reducing uncertainty and improving future policy per-formance will be a more aggressive inflation fighter than the central bank that implements Brainard's recommendation myopically. However, this central bank will still act more gradually than one that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions to this rule arise only when uncertainty is very high and at the same time inflation close to target.
The preceding analysis can be extended along several dimensions. Some of these extensions are straightforward while others are interesting avenues for future research. The remainder of this section discusses four such extensions.
Flexible inflation targeting
So far, the paper studied policy rules for a strictly inflation targeting central bank that focuses exclusively on inflation. However, the framework developed in this paper carries over to flexible inflation targeting with a loss function that includes deviations of unemployment from its natural rate:
As is well known, the unemployment stabilization objective introduces an alternative motive for the central bank to respond gradually to inflationary shocks. This is directly apparent from a comparison of the optimal interest rate rules under certainty for strict inflation targeting, equation (11), and the one for flexible inflation targeting:
A central bank that assigns a positive weight ω to unemployment deviations will respond less aggressively to inflation deviations from target. As a result, inflation will be expected to return more gradually to the target subsequent a shock. Policy rules under uncertainty can be computed in the same manner as for strict inflation targeting. However, due to the non-normal distribution of u * one needs to resort to numerical methods even in the case of the cautionary rule that is optimal in the static version of the model without learning.
The qualitative properties of the optimal rule under strict inflation targeting will survive under flexible inflation targeting, but of course, quantitative results will differ.
Optimal policy under discretion
Having considered policy choices for a central bank that is able to commit to a specific rule, it is of interest to explore optimal policy under discretion. Under discretion, the central bank will optimize policy taking private sector expectations as given. The private sector will try to minimize expectational errors taking the central bank's response to private sector expectations as given. The main purpose of Clarke et al. (1999) is to compare optimal policy under discretion and commitment. However, they assume that the parameters of the economy are known with certainty. The optimal policy under discretion may be derived as follows. First, one determines the interest rate that minimizes the central bank's loss function (1) treating the private sector agents expectation of the interest rate, i e t , and thus their inflation expectation π e as constant and independent of monetary policy. With known parameters this corresponds to:
Private sector agents set i e t and thus π e t to minimize forecasts errors taking the central bank's response as given. The rational expectation of inflation taking (32) as given corresponds to the inflation target π * . The nominal interest rate in this Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the interest rate rule under commitment derived in (11). Differences between optimal policy under discretion and commitment arise once a policy tradeoff is introduced, such as the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment in the case of flexible inflation targeting under certainty, or the tradeoff between the expected inflation deviation from target and its conditional variance under parameter uncertainty as in section 3 of this paper. The cautionary policy under discretion can be derived analytically following the procedure suggested here. The computation of the optimal policy under discretion in the dynamic model with learning poses an additional complication of the numerical analysis that would be an interesting problem to address in future research. 29
Demand uncertainty
While studying the implications of uncertainty about the relationship between unemployment and inflation in much detail, the other key relationships of the model have been treated as certain in the preceding analysis. An extension of the model would allow for uncertainty due to random shocks ( u t , y t ) and imprecisely estimated parameters in the Okun's law and aggregate demand relationships such as
with beliefs regarding φ and λ characterized by normal distributions
The presence of the random shocks u t and y t renders estimation of φ and λ nontrivial.
The resulting imprecision of the parameter estimates will further increase the component of inflation uncertainty that is influenced by monetary policy. Thus, it will enhance the motive for caution and widen the wedge between certainty-equivalent and cautionary policy rules. Increased parameter uncertainty will also tend to strengthen the incentive for experimentation and consequently the difference between optimal and cautionary rules. The demand-side shocks, however, imply some random variation in output and unemployment that will improve the estimates of the parameters of the inflation equation and will tend to reduce the incentive for experimentation. It is possible to derive the cautionary policy rule for the case when the Phillips curve parameters as well as φ and λ are imprecisely estimated, but the curse of dimensionality prevents the numerical analysis of optimal learning treating all these parameters as jointly unknown. Nevertheless, the techniques presented in this paper can be used to derive optimal policy rules under uncertainty about φ and λ separately.
Asymmetric information and heterogenous beliefs
29 Such an analysis would be related to the theoretical framework developed by Nyarko (1998) .
A key assumption maintained throughout this paper is that rational forward-looking agents and the central bank have the same information set available when making decisions. As result of this assumption, agents and central bank update their beliefs regarding the parameters of the inflation equation (α, β, γ) in the same manner. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that the central bank has an informational advantage compared to the public. This is more likely with regard to current estimates of the state of the economy and short-horizon forecasts than with regard to fundamental issues concerning the structure of the economy. Heterogenous beliefs about the parameters of the economy are more likely to arise to differences between agents and central banks in terms of their priors on reasonable parameter values or their view regarding the appropriate structural model.
It is straightforward to introduce an informational advantage of the central bank in terms of an advance signal e t about the inflation shock t into the model of this paper. The optimal policy rule will then include a policy response to this signal quite similar in qualitative terms to the policy response to lagged inflation. The private sector's rational expectation of this component of the interest rate rule will be equal zero. Thus, private sector agents will only be able to predict the component of the policy rule that responds to lagged inflation. Since the signal e t does not help in estimating the Phillips curve parameters, belief updating equations will remain the same for the central bank and the private sector.
The possibility of heterogenous beliefs due to differences in priors or in the reference model represents a particularly interesting area for future research. One difficulty in this regard is that one will need to keep track of the central bank's and private agents' beliefs separately. This will substantially increase the state space of the optimal learning problem.
Nevertheless, it should be feasible to study a problem with one unknown parameter and two sets of alternative beliefs using the techniques developed in this paper. 
This upper bound can easily be calculated since it only depends on the discount factor and the distance between the approximations obtained from the last and the preceding iteration. The time needed for convergence within a maximal error bound can be reduced significantly by introducing policy iterations in between every value iteration. A policy iteration implies the application of the following operator:
The functions W (.) and the updating equations to obtain π and θ are known functions and the conditional density of π is normal. Thus the integral can be calculated using Gaussian quadrature and values of W 0 from the table, where W (.) is evaluated in between grid points by linear interpolation.
Given an approximation for this integral the minimization problem on the right-hand side of the functional equation can be solved by standard numerical optimization procedures. However the search for the minimum turns out to be difficult because there may exist multiple local minima. As a consequence there may be kinks in the value function and discontinuities in the optimal policy. Therefore I use a slow but secure optimization procedure such as golden section search supplemented by a rough initial grid search. For each value of (θ, π), the minimum in u gives the value of W 1 () used to update the table. The maximum of |W 1 (θ, π) − W 0 (θ, π)| is used to calculate the upper bound of the approximation error. Finally, the whole procedure is repeated to obtain W 2 and so on until the difference between two successive approximations is sufficiently small (< 0.5%).
Computation Costs
The numerical dynamic programming problems dealt with in this paper require substantial computational effort largely because of the so-called curse of dimensionality. The largest problem considered had six state variables. If each of the six state variables is approximated with a grid of N gridpoints, the integration and optimization procedures described above have to be carried out N 6 times to complete one value iteration. The optimization step is especially time-consuming because of the existence of multiple local optima.
Several steps have been taken to reduce computation time: (i) the introduction of policy iterations, which reduce the number of value iterations needed for convergence, and thus the number of times that the optimization procedure has to be executed; (ii) a convenient reformulation of the problem allows the reduction of the state space by one state variable, which means that the integration and optimization steps only have to be carried out N 5 times per value iteration; 30 (iii) the algorithm is written in FORTRAN so ad to reduce computation time relative to higher-level languages such as MATLAB.
The most time-consuming problems computed in this paper are those with two unknown parameters. The largest grid used in this case consisted of 13 * 15 * 19 * 16 * 29 gridpoints. In this case, I also used 60-point Gaussian quadrature with respect to the shock . Convergence as defined by a 0.5% maximal difference between the two final value function approximations for these problems was achieved after about 60 hours on a 2.4. GHz Intel Pentium 4 Chip with 1 MB RAM. Typically convergence required 6 to 8 value iterations with a declining number of policy iterations (50 or less) in between every value iteration.
Appendix B: Convergence of Beliefs and Policies
Although the paper so far discussed in detail optimal policies with dynamic learning, it avoided the question whether the central bank and private agents will eventually learn the true parameter values as more and more data becomes available. This question has been the focus of a theoretical literature on optimal learning in a controlled regression framework (eg. Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) ). The learning problem considered here differs from the regression framework studied in that literature in several ways: (i) the intercept may be time-varying, (ii) the regression includes a lagged dependent variable, and (iii) the regression includes an expectation of the dependent variable.
In a framework where the natural unemployment rate is time-varying, the need for learning and adjusting policy in response to changes in parameter estimates persists through time. A policymaker who considers that the NAIRU may change, will always attach a positive variance to her beliefs about the unknown intercept and adjust policy accordingly. Uncertainty about the intercept is renewed in every period and the policymaker will never learn the true natural rate because it will keep changing.
In the case of a constant natural rate, one can bring some of the convergence results obtained by Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) (KN) to bear on this problem. In the following I discuss convergence for the formulation with adaptive expectations of the private sector π e t = π t−1 but the argument can be generalized to the case with rational learning on the part of private agents. Under adaptive expectations the coefficient on lagged inflation in the Phillips curve corresponds to 1, and α and β can be estimated by means of this simple regression ∆π t = α − βu t + t
with the change rather than the level of inflation as dependent variable. The parameter estimates and covariance matrix are updated according to an appropriately simplified version of (25). This corresponds to Bayesian updating of bivariate normal beliefs. KN provide a general convergence result that applies to this class of regression equations. They show that under general assumptions concerning the form of beliefs and the shock process, the process of posterior beliefs always converges with probability 1 (Theorem 4.1., p. 577). However, the limiting belief may or may not be centered on the true values. The proof of this theorem relies on an application of the martingale convergence theorem. It is straightforward to confirm that the point estimates a t and b t in (25) Whether the process of posterior beliefs converges to the truth or not, depends on the behavior of the series of unemployment rates u t . KN provide two results that hold for simple regressions. First, if u t does not converge, then the process of posterior beliefs converges to the point mass on the true parameter values (Theorem 4.2., p. 577). Second, if u t does converge to a limit value, then the posterior beliefs may converge to a limit belief that does not coincide with the true parameter values. This introduces the possibility of incomplete learning. At a minimum however the decision maker learns the mean of the dependent variable that corresponds to the limiting value of u t (Theorem 4.3., p. 578). KN then characterize the set of possible (including incorrect) limit beliefs and policies. However, without solving for the optimal policy, KN cannot determine the frequency with which incomplete learning may occur. This question has been addressed in Wieland (2000a) and (2000b) . 32 With a constant natural rate the model considered in this paper generates complete learning of the unknown parameters under all of the three policy feedback rules. Because the accelerationist Phillips curve contains a unit root, any policy that attempts to permanently lower (raise) the unemployment rate below (above) the natural rate, would imply that the rate of inflation goes towards +(-) infinity. Furthermore, a policy that stabilizes unemployment exactly at its natural rate, would render the inflation process a random walk. Inflation only remains under control if the policymaker pursues an active stabilization policy that responds to past values of the inflation rate. Using this property of the model, one can appeal to theorems 4.1. and 4.2. in KN to prove that complete learning will occur. First, theorem 4.1. implies that the process of posterior beliefs (a t , b t , Σ t ) about the unknown parameters α and β in (41) converges with probability one to a limit belief (a ∞ , b ∞ , Σ ∞ ) as t → ∞. For any given belief, the unemployment rate that obtains under the cautionary policy, is a function of the means, the variance of the slope, the covariance, and the preceding period's inflation rate. For example, in any time period t the unemployment rate associated with a given belief (a ∞ , b ∞ , Σ ∞ ) would be:
Because policy responds to the preceding period's inflation rate, the unemployment rate effectively is a function of the preceding period's price shock t−1 . In each time period, a new shock is realized. Thus, even if the policymaker's beliefs were to remain constant, the unemployment rate would keep changing over time. Consequently, u t does not converge; and, according to theorem 4.2 in KN, the process of posterior beliefs converges to the point mass on the true parameter values, (a t , b t , v a t , v b t , v ab t ) → (α, β, 0, 0, 0) with probability 1 as t → ∞.
To build further intuition concerning the asymptotic properties of beliefs and policies it is useful to consider the relationship between posterior beliefs and the sequence of unemployment rates more directly. The elements of the covariance matrix are related to the 31 This is true because ut is a deterministic function of it and effectively part of the central bank's information set at t-1.
32 Wieland (2000a) using numerical methods has characterized the value function and optimal policy for controlling a simple regression with two unknown parameters as in KN. Optimal experimentation was found to be most pronounced in the neighborhood of potentially self-reinforcing incorrect beliefs. Wieland (2000b) has shown that a myopic, passive-learning policy in a model with unknown money demand may frequently be uninformative and induce a long-lasting bias in the setting of the policy instrument that would not emerge under the optimal policy.
